ABSTRACT. This article investigates the representative-agent hypothesis for a population which faces a collective choice from a given finite-dimensional space of alternatives. Each individual's preference ordering is assumed to admit a utility representaion through an element of an exogenously given set of admissible utility functions. In addition, we assume that (i) the class of admissible utility functions allows for a smooth parametrization and only consists of strictly concave functions, (ii) the population is infinite, and (iii) the social welfare function satisfies Arrovian rationality axioms. We prove that there exists an admissible utility function r, called representative utility function, such that any alternative which maximizes r also maximizes the social welfare function. Given the structural similarities among the admissible utility functions (due to parametrization), we argue that the representative utility function can be interpreted as belonging to anactual or invisible -individual.
INTRODUCTION
The existence of a representative agent for a given population is as ubiquitous an assumption in macroeconomic theory as it is controversial, to say the least, from a microeconomic perspective (see Kirman 1992 and also Hartley 1996) . Methodologically, the representative-agent hypothesis is of utmost importance for many branches of macroeconomics, since it provides a -however tentative -microfoundation for models which otherwise would arguably be up in the air.
So far, there have been only few attempts at underpinning the macroeconomic representative-agent hypothesis itself. Clark (1992) has provided an indirect justification for certain representative utility functions through randomized social choice theory. A vindication for the representative consumer hypothesis -of course, without reference to normative social choice theory -can be found in a paper by Dow and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (1988) . Even the construction of a representative agent in general equilibrium theory (à la Negishi 1960) does not provide a social-choice theoretic foundation for representative-agent models as they are employed in macroeconomic policy analysis.
Typically, representative agent models are used in policy analysis to study one of two possible scenarios: Either one assumes the social planner's goal to be (1) the maximization of the social welfare function, or one postulates that the social planner aims at (2) the maximization of some other utility function which depends on the aggregate reaction of the population to his or her policy choices. The first situation is to some extent simpler and will be the subject of the present paper.
In our defense of the representative-agent hypothesis, we consider a population which has to make a social choice from a given set of alternatives. Suppose that a set of admissible utility functions is given, and that every individual's preference ordering can be represented by some admissible utility function. Assume that the population's collective decision A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL UTILITY FUNCTION 3 procedure is given by a social welfare function in the sense of Arrovian social choice theory (Arrow 1963) . We call an admissible utility function r representative if and only if every alternative which maximizes r also maximizes the social welfare function. If such a representative utility function exists, then the social planner can determine an optimal social choice simply by maximizing a single admissible utility function. A related notion which we introduce in this paper is the concept of a socially acceptable utility function, an admissible utility function whose maximum argument can never be overturned by any decisive coalition.
However, a representative utility function should only be regarded as the utility function of some representative individual if it exhibits some similarities to the utility functions of the actual individuals in the population. Now, the more restrictive the set of admissible utility functions is defined, the more justified is the interpretation of each admissible utility function -including any representative utility function -as belonging to an "individual". (Generically, such an "individual" will be invisible, that is, it will not coincide wih any actual individual in the population.) For this reason, we shall impose rich structural assumptions on the set of admissible utilities.
1
In this paper, we construct a representative utility function under the following assumptions: (i) The set of alternatives is a finite-dimensional 1
In the opposite border case -where each arbitrary real-valued function on the set of alternatives is considered an admissible utility function -the existence of a socially acceptable and representative utility is merely a corollary of the results of Kirman and Sondermann (1972): As Sondermann (personal communication, 2009 ) has pointed out, if (a) all functions from the set of alternatives to the real numbers are assumed to be admissible and (b) the set of alternatives is either finite or possesses some suitable topology, then (α) there is a one-to-one correspondence between weak orders and admissible utility functions modulo monotonic transformations, and (β) the unique utility representation of the preference relation of the "invisible dictator" introduced by Kirman and Sondermann (1972) is both a socially acceptable and a representative utility function. by Kirman and Sondermann (1972) , that the set of decisive coalitions is a non-principal ultrafilter.
The crucial step in our construction is the choice of a socially acceptable utility function as defined above, and it will turn out that the parameter vector of this socially acceptable utility function can be explicitly derived from the sequence of parameter vectors of the individual utility functions.
2
In fact, the existence of a regular parametrization for the class of admissible utility functions (assumption (i) above) already implies the existence of a socially acceptable utility function for any collection of decisive coalitions which is a non-principal ultrafilter (Theorem 1). Robinson 1966 Robinson , 1996 . 4 In both cases the (bounded) ultrapowers are formed with respect to the non-principal ultrafilter of decisive coalitions.
The rest of the introduction is devoted to a brief methodological discussion, in which we shall relate and compare the previous use of ultrafilters and ultraproducts in social choice theory with the method of proof in this present paper.
Ultrafilters have been applied extensively in social choice theory for nearly four decades: First, Fishburn (1970) proved that the axioms in Arrow's social choice theorem 5 are consistent for economies with infinitely 3 The connection between social choice theory and model theory (as a subfield of mathematical logic) has been described by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995) . 4 Nonstandard analysis is a subfield of mathematics which makes consistent use of infinitesimals in mathematical analysis (including functional analysis and stochastic analysis), based on techniques from mathematical logic. Anderson (1991) provides an introduction to nonstandard analysis with an emphasis on applications in mathematical economics. 5 These axioms are: the existence of at least three alternatives, universality (i.e.
unrestricted domain), independence, the Pareto principle, and non-dictatorship. In addition, it is assumed that the range of the social choice function only consists of weak orders, i.e. asymmetric, negatively transitive binary relations, on the set of alternatives.
many individuals, although they are inconsistent for economies with finitely many individuals. Hansson (1971 , Postscript 1976 ) strenghened these results. In the seminal work by Kirman and Sondermann (1972) , it was
shown that under the assumption of some measure-theoretic structure on the set of individuals, Arrow's axioms can lead, even for economies with infinitely many individuals, to an invisible dictator, i.e. to a decreasing sequence of winning coalitions with arbitrarily small measure. Armstrong (1980, 1985) generalized Kirman and Sondermann's (1972) results to measure spaces of individuals. Other generalizations of Kirman and Sondermann's (1972) analysis were discovered by Grafe and Grafe (1983) as well as (for intergenerational economies) Campbell (1990) . Schmitz (1977) showed that Kirman and Sondermann's (1972) results cannot be extended to spaces of individuals that are endowed with an infinite measure, and Hansson (1976) pointed out that for some topologies on the population set, there will even be multiple invisible dictators, which seems to stretch the term "dictator" too far.
Ultraproducts -a model-theoretic construction based on ultrafilters (cf. Some other applications of ultrafilters in the social sciences, with a particular emphasis on de Condorcet's (1785) paradox, were recently reviewed by Haddad (2005) . The existence of non-principal ultrafilters, under the assumption of the Axiom of Choice, was established by Ulam (1929) and Tarski (1930) ; the main results on ultraproducts are due to Łoś (1955) .
Bounded ultrapowers are a very special ultraproduct construction in set theory and are typically used to provide semantic foundations for nonstandard analysis (cf. Robinson and Zakon 1969) . So far, neither bounded ultrapowers nor nonstandard analysis have ever been applied in the social choice literature.
The mathematical reasoning in this paper depends crucially on the connection between (bounded) ultrapowers and nonstandard analysis: We shall employ a bounded ultrapower with respect to an exogenously given ultrafilter (the collection of decisive coalitions) as a semantic framework for nonstandard analysis and then utilize the powerful proof techniques of nonstandard analysis in order to construct a socially acceptable utility function (as defined above). The rest of the argument is straightforward and
The first point seems particularly well-taken from a foundational stance: After all, the ultrafilter existence theorem is a consequence of the Axiom of Choice and is independent from the other axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (cf. Feferman 1965), although it is not equivalent to the Axiom of Choice (cf. Halpern and Levy 1971 and also Banaschewski 1983) . However, in social choice problems, ultrafilters are typically given exogeneously, as collections of decisive coalitions derived from an aggregation function, thus any "insuperable arbitrariness" would be inherited from an aggregation rule itself!
The second objection -the fact that ultrafilters do not necessarily formalize our notion of "almost all" -does not at all preclude their use in social choice theory, since collective decision making sometimes ignores significant minorities. In this paper, for instance, we shall use an ultrafilter on the population set to model the set of those coalitions which determine the social planner's policy. Hence, the ultrafilter is an exogeneous variable of the model, and it only captures a notion of "most" or even just "sufficiently many", not a concept of "almost all". Finally, we should emphasize that the description of the model and the statement of our results are completely "standard"; they do not involve 7 An alternative summary of our argument would be the following: In order to build a social-choice theoretic foundation for representative-agent models for populations with parametric individual utilities, we consider an infinite population N of individuals whose utilities are functions of the social planner's policy. We suppose that these functions can be parametrized in a smooth and strictly concave manner. We consider an exogeneously given system of decisive coalitions which form a non-principal ultrafilter D on N and we note that every non-dictatorial Arrovian social welfare function on an infinite population induces such a D (Fishburn 1970 , Kirman and Sondermann 1972 , Hansson 1976 . The role of the social planner is to implement the social choice of the population. In other words, the social planner must maximize, simultaneously, the utility of each individual in some decisive coalition. We show that this problem can be reduced to maximizing just one element of the parametrized set of individual utility functions (the socially acceptable utility function). Finally, one can show that this socially acceptable utility function is a representative utility function in a rigorous sense. This representative utility function can be interpreted as belonging to a representative individual, even though there does not need to be an actual individual in the population to which this utility function belongs. In this sense, our results clarify the ontological status of the representative agent.
The proof for the existence of the socially acceptable utility function (Theorem 1) involves both a classical ultrapower construction and implicitly also a bounded ultrapower of a superstructure (through Robinsonian nonstandard analysis) -both with respect to the non-principal ultrafilter of the decisive coalitions in the population. any concepts from nonstandard analysis or model theory. The use of nonstandard analysis and mathematical logic is limited to the proofs.
MODEL FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we consider the following model for a population which faces a social choice situation and whose individuals have preferences which can be represented through certain admissible utility functions.
2.1. Population. We fix a set N , the population. Elements of N are called individuals, subsets of N coalitions. We fix some subset D of the power-set of N . The elements of D will be called potentially decisive coalitions.
For our results, we shall later on assume that D is non-principal ultrafilter and hence that N is infinite.
Alternatives.
We also fix a set X, the set of alternatives.
For our results, we will have to assume that X is a non-zero finitedimensional vector space; for simplicity, we shall assume X = R m for some positive integer m.
Utilities.
We fix some class M of functions from X to R. The elements of M are called admissible utility functions. For our results, we shall later on assume that M only consists of strictly concave utility functions (from X = R m to R) and that M can be smoothly parametrized.
We assume that, given any individual i ∈ N , the (individual) utility function of i, denoted u i , is admissible (i.e. an element of M). Elements of M N will be called utility profiles. We introduce u as shorthand notation for a utility profile u i i∈N .
AXIOMS
Having described the ontology of the model in Section 2, we now formulate assumptions which (i) ensure that our notion of decisive sets is consistent with the usual social choice terminology and (ii) allow us to construct a representative individual utility function. This, however, is only possible if N is infinite. Thus, our first axiom is:
Axiom 1 (Decisive Coalitions). D is a non-principal ultrafilter on N . In particular, N is infinite.
The key assumption for the construction of a representative utility function is the existence of a sufficiently regular parametrization of the admissible utility functions. We now formulate the properties of this parametrization.
Axiom 2 (Parametrization). X = R m . Moreover, there exist d ∈ N and a twice continuously differentiable function
In particular, given any utility profile u, there is an
We adopt the standard notation for derivatives: For each x ∈ R m , the first 
AGGREGATION
We now link the model of Section 2 with classical Arrovian social choice theory. For this purpose, we first review some terminology from normative social choice theory, along the lines of the presentation in Kirman and Sondermann (1972).
Individual preferences. A relation P ⊆ X ×X is called a weak order
if and only if P satisfies both of the following properties:
(1) P is asymmetric: For all x, y ∈ X, if xP y then not yP x.
(2) P is negatively transitive: For all x, y, z ∈ X, if neither xP y nor yP z then also not xP z.
Herein, xP y is shorthand for x, y ∈ P , and should be read as: 'x is preferred to y.' Let P be the set of weak orders on X. For all x, y ∈ X and P = P i i∈N ∈ P N , we define C (x, y, P ) := {i ∈ N : xP i y} .
For x ∈ X and P ∈ P, x will be called P -maximal if and only if xP y for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL UTILITY FUNCTION
For u : X → R and P ∈ P, we say that u is a utility representation of P if and only if for all x, y ∈ X,
Given any u, there is obviously a unique P whose utility representation is u. This relation will be denoted by P u , and one easily verifies that P u ∈ P.
Given an N -sequence u = u i i∈N of functions from X to R (as in Section 2), we define
We say that the utility profile u induces the preference profile P u .
Social welfare functions.
A social welfare function is a map σ :
Hence, we only allow for universal social welfare functions.
Consider now Arrow's rationality axioms for σ:
Axiom 4 (Unanimity Preservation; Pareto Principle). For all x, y ∈ X and
Axiom 5 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives).
For all x, y ∈ X and P , P ∈ P N , if both C (x, y, P ) = C (x, y, P ) and C (y, x, P ) = C (y, x, P ) then
Axiom 6 (No Dictatorship). There exists no i 0 ∈ N such that for all x, y ∈ X and P ∈ P N ,
We say that a coalition C ⊆ N is σ-decisive if and only if for all x, y ∈ X and P ∈ P N one has xσ (P ) y whenever xP i y for all i ∈ C and yP j x for all j ∈ N \ C. The set of σ-decisive coalitions is denoted by D σ . If Axioms 4,5 are satisfied, then Sen's (1995) Field Extension Lemma implies that for every σ-decisive C and for all x, y ∈ X and P ∈ P N , one already has xσ (P ) y if simply xP i y for all i ∈ C. In the (trivial) special case where there exists some α 0 such that
is a representative utility function.
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As elaborated by Kirman and Sondermann (1972) , Hansson (1971 , Postscript 1976 , Armstrong (1980 Armstrong ( , 1985 and Schmitz (1977) , even such non-dictatorial social welfare functions can still exhibit invisible dictatorship, viz. if and only if N is endowed with a certain topological or measure-theoretic structure (e.g. a finite, countably additive measure). We assumed the family of decisive coalitions to form a non-principal ultrafilter. 10 The parameter vector of the representative utility function is the standard part -in the sense of Robinson's (1966 Robinson's ( , 1996 
